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ABSTRACT
Extraterritorial migration management perspectives on how states
try to enforce immigration controls beyond their juridical borders
are strongly influenced by ‘remote control’ metaphors. This is
conceptually limited and outdated. Most research fails to
sufficiently acknowledge agency by a destination state’s officials
acting abroad, foreign states and their officials, when evaluating
extraterritorial measures and ‘outcomes’. We study UK liaison
officers abroad, specifically, how they see their efforts to
implement extraterritorial immigration control through
interactions with foreign state officials. Our approach links inter-
state relations to the social world of on-the-ground ‘street-level’
interactions between officers abroad and their foreign
counterparts. The empirical analysis draws from original interviews
and official sources. We compare factors accounting for the UK’s
activities and perceived ‘outcomes’ across USA, France, Thailand,
Egypt and Ghana. Findings show the UK’s extraterritorial
migration management results from a very long chain of decisions
and actions, by foreign and UK state actors, operating at different
institutional-levels, with uncontrollable local circumstances abroad.
Realising extraterritorial goals depends strongly on liaison officers’
agency, ‘soft power’ over foreign officials and foreign officials’
willingness to cooperate. Meanwhile liaison officers’ ‘feedbacks’
importantly influence Home Office decision-making. Against the
simplistic one-way causality of ‘remote control’, this is ‘street-level’
agency beyond ‘remote control’.
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Introduction
Over the last decades, a significant literature has emerged on liberal nation-states’ strat-
egies for extraterritorial migration management: immigration control operations that
take place beyond a state’s own juridical borders on foreign sovereign territory (Boswell
2003; Lavenex 2006; Ryan and Mitsilegas 2010; Zaiotti 2016). Following Zolberg’s influen-
tial study, a state’s efforts to impose extraterritorial controls are usually discussed through
‘remote control’ metaphors (Zolberg 1997:308; 2003). In an important update, FitzGerald
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offers a definition (2020:9): ‘Remote control is a set of practices, physical structures, and
institutions whose goal is (to) control the mobility of individuals while they are outside the
territory of their intended destination state. One goal is to filter migrants and select whom
can pass. Another goal is to identify, monitor, detain, deport, and deter the unwanted
through an architecture of repulsion’. This research field strongly focuses on receiving
states’ efforts to exert highly restrictive policies through actions abroad, especially prevent-
ing asylum seekers at source and in transit. In this way, liberal nation-states bypass ‘liberal’
obligations they place on themselves on their own sovereign territory for upholding
human, civil and personhood rights, including non-refoulement (Joppke 1998).
While acknowledging important advances, we argue inherent limitations persist.
‘Remote control’ invokes the technology of an age when it appeared novel that people
changed channels on their analogue television sets by pushing a button while remaining
in the comfort of their armchairs. But the world is no longer analogue. Applying
‘remote control’ metaphors to immigration, keeps the idea that the only actor who
matters and has agency is the destination liberal-state, that once desired, ‘remote
control’ is relatively easily achieved, and ‘outcomes’ are determined by the button-
pusher’s preferences. All these assumptions are questionable, but ‘remote control’
remains an influential interpretive framework.
By arguing for a perspective on agency beyond ‘remote control’, we build on conceptual
advances that emphasise the global interconnectedness of a nation-state system of extrater-
ritorial migration controls (FitzGerald 2019, 2020), while providing original substantive evi-
dence that the UK’s approach is shaped by factors little discussed by most ‘remote control’
studies: how agency by liaison officers abroad, foreign states, and their officials, influences
‘outcomes’. To move beyond destination-state-centric ‘remote control’ perspectives, we
study how the UK Home Office’s efforts to enforce extraterritorial initiatives are strongly
shaped by: first, relationships with foreign states, with their own policy priorities over popu-
lation movement; second, UK officers’ attempts to establishmeaningful relations abroad and
influence their foreign counterparts; and third, foreign state immigration and law enforce-
ment officers’ willingness to act in ways that support the UK’s goals. We examine British
liaison officers’ perceptions of their activities, working relations with foreign counterparts,
effectiveness, ‘feedbacks’ to the Home Office, and resultant ‘outcomes’.
The UK’s liaison network, Immigration Enforcement International (IEI)1, comprises
civil servants posted abroad, who evaluate conditions, provide information, and help
enforce the visa system and immigration goals, as a ‘main delivery agent for offshore
migration control’ (FCO 2008:107). It is the ‘overseas arm’ for Immigration Enforcement
– the Home Office agency responsible for detecting and removing people who have broken
the state’s immigration rules and procedures (HM Government 2016). In 2015, the UK
had 188 liaison officers working in 45 cities in 36 countries, but refused to identify the
number of personnel per country (Ostrand FOI 40413). This deep secrecy over external
immigration activities perhaps explains why there is virtually no research on liaison
officers’ on-the-ground operations. Although liaison networks are namechecked from
policy documents (Mau et al 2012; Scholten 2015; FitzGerald 2019), no studies
examine: the activities and efficacy of personnel abroad; how liaison efforts are
implemented in specific ‘sending/transit’ states; and factors that shape variations in activi-
ties across foreign states. Original data is collated from 20 interviews with Home Office
officials, Freedom of Information (FOI) requests, and research on primary and secondary
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official documents. Given a lack of transparency around extraterritorial migration activi-
ties, gathering this information was challenging.
Moving beyond limitations of bi-lateral case studies, we discuss liaison officers’ activi-
ties in five countries: France, the USA, Thailand, Egypt and Ghana. All countries are sig-
nificantly large and populated that they have some potential for ‘push back’ against the
UK’s immigration goals, should they wish to. However, our selection allows comparison
across variations by region, degree of political interconnectedness, historical and cultural
ties, economic development and interdependency. The UK joins fellow wealthy nation-
states France and the USA in numerous intergovernmental initiatives (EU with France
before Brexit; NATO) leading to significant reciprocal cooperations in immigration and
security matters. By contrast, Egypt and Ghana are less economically advanced lower-
middle-income developing nation-states in Africa. They are former British colonies, but
Britain defines them as ‘high risk’ sources for ‘unwanted’ immigration and makes
efforts to implement control measures, as the more powerful partner in an unequal
relationship. Finally, Thailand is an upper-middle-income developing nation-state with
which Britain has few institutionalised intergovernmental ties, and no tradition for
direct colonial rule. However, Thailand experiences massive flows of foreign nationals
moving in and out each year – including 38 million tourists (Statham et al 2020;
UNTWO 2019). Thailand is perceived as an important ‘transit’ country for people
moving to the Global North.
We find important variations across the UK’s efforts to implement extraterritorial
measures in foreign states. However, an important general finding is that because
liaison officers everywhere have to work on-the-ground in an environment where
formal authority is retained by the foreign state, they have to engage significantly in
‘soft power’ persuasion tactics to try and achieve UK goals. In effect, this gives officers con-
siderable discretion and autonomy in their actions. It means that the practical implemen-
tation of measures is relatively open to influence by officers’ decisions, evaluations and
initiatives on location, but also by their foreign counterparts, and the quality of relation-
ships they are able to establish with them. So ‘remote control’ is de facto less controlled
than the image depicted by UK policy statements, designed for domestic consumption,
and more open to mid-level officials’ agency, unintended ‘outcomes’, and happenchance
occurrences.
The next section places our approach within extraterritorial migration management
perspectives. We then present an analytic descriptive model that identifies the relation-
ships between states and actors, and locates the actor field between liaison officers and
their foreign counterparts, that we argue is influential in shaping ‘outcomes’ on-the-
ground, and providing influential ‘feedbacks’ for UK policy decisions. This framework
provides the basis for us to compare variations in these relationships across the countries
in our empirical study. Finally, our concluding discussion re-evaluates ‘remote control’
perspectives alongside key findings.
Extraterritorial migration management
Most research on how governments try to regulate international mobility through inter-
ventions outside their sovereign territories is written from a destination state’s perspective
and focuses almost exclusively on restrictive measures (Boswell 2003; Gibney 2005;
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Lavenex 2006; Nethery, Rafferty-Brown and Taylor 2012; Ryan and Mitsilegas 2010;
Zaiotti 2016). Studies look at: first, a state’s decision-making leading to domestic policy
goals for managing migration through restrictive immigration controls located abroad
(e.g. Boswell 2003); or second, a state’s efforts to establish immigration control mechan-
isms in countries perceived as an ‘immigration risk’ (e.g. Zaiotti 2016). The one-sidedness
focussing on restrictions forgets Zolberg’s (1989:408) famous dictum that migration man-
agement involves not only erecting ‘walls’ but also ‘small doors’ that allow selected
migrants to enter. Typically, extraterritorialisation is studied as a government strategy
by a receiving state to achieve its immigration objectives (within domestic politics),
while foreign sending and transit states are reduced to relatively passive or powerless
‘policy-takers’ or a background contextual factor.
The story is almost always told from a Global North liberal nation-state’s perspective,
that sees itself as a destination for ‘unwanted’ immigration from a source or transit state in
the Global South.2 In fact, our study shows extraterritorialisation efforts are not just
between stronger and weaker states, but also occur between powerful states who have a
more equal relationship, for example, when the UK established a liaison network in
New York to combat ‘unwanted’ immigration from the Caribbean and Central and
South America. With a few exceptions (FitzGerald 2019:101–122; Tittel-Mosser 2018;
Wolff 2016), another problem is that agency is attributed almost exclusively to powerful
destination states.3 Thus Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen (2015:243) consider
sending and transit states ‘conscripted’ … ‘to effect migration control on behalf of the
developed world’. While Lavenex (2006:30) talks about cooperation with non-EU states
as another ‘venue’ for interior ministries in Europe to ‘escape from internal blockades’
and implement restrictive immigration policies. Importantly, few efforts include foreign
states’ and officials’ agency.
FitzGerald’s (2019/2020) state-of-the-art contribution importantly advances ‘remote
control’. First, he includes extraterritorial measures within today’s global system of immi-
gration management, rather than as exceptional to ‘normal’ activities at a state’s sovereign
borders. ‘Migration control takes place on a continuum of space, from the most remote
practices half a planet away down to walls at the state boundary, where remote control
merges with border line control’ (FitzGerald 2020:5). Second, applying the ‘hierarchy of
sovereignty’ concept (Lake 2009), he argues that while nation-states, as institutional
forms, continue to monopolise the legitimate means of movement, some individual
states do not monopolise control within their own territories. As a result of increasing
interdependency in a world of nation-states, the exercise of sovereignty by nation-states
has become ‘messy’, with powerful states calling the shots (2020:16): ‘Rather than each
nation-state exercising full practical sovereignty over its own territory, there is a ‘hierarchy
of sovereignty’ (Lake 2009) in which more powerful states exercise considerable influence
over migratory movements from and through other states’ territories’.
FitzGerald places ‘remote control’ within a system of interdependent nation-states
characterised by asymmetric power relations between powerful destination states, and
weaker transit and source states, which leads to a shared coercion of movement. This
importantly moves beyond earlier ‘remote control’ perspectives by recognising that avail-
able migration pathways are shaped by global interdependencies of nation-states and
inequalities. However, his study stops there. It retains the bias that powerful destination
states can largely get their way with transit and sending states. But this remains an
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assumption not interrogated by further analysis. Like many studies, there is a reliance on
taking what policies say they do at face value and few details on the mechanisms through
which interactions between destination, transit and source states are mediated by officials
on-the-ground. In this contribution, we aim to add detail on these mechanisms by study-
ing liaison officers’ and foreign officials’ agency, and their interactive relationships, as
important factors that shape different ‘outcomes’ across countries.
Several scholars address the policy adaption of transit and source states in response to
persuasion techniques, diplomatic pressures and financial incentives by powerful states,
and the European Union (Lavanex and Ucarer 2004; Flynn 2014; Geddes and Taylor
2015; Nethery, Rafferty-Brown and Taylor 2012). However, few study the reverse relation-
ship: how demands by transit and source states shape destination states’ policies and prac-
tices. One field that acknowledges some impact by source and transit states is EU bi-lateral
agreements. Analysing the impact of external countries on EU states’ efforts to deport
migrants, Ellermann (2008) shows how the relative willingness of foreign authorities to
cooperate sets boundaries for actions by member states. Specifically, she explains policy
failures by ‘the refusal of many foreign governments to cooperate in the control efforts
of advanced democracies’ (Ellermann 2008:169). In addition, Wolff (2016:89) finds dom-
estic and regional politics in Turkey and Morocco importantly shaped their motivations to
agree to readmission agreements: ‘(they) are not passive actors when confronted with the
externalisation of border controls and are able to influence to some extent the EU’ (see also
Tittel-Mosser 2018).
Another important contribution by Ellermann (2008) is she demonstrates that studying
the formal policies of bi-lateral agreements says relatively little about what actually occurs
on-the-ground when officials try to implement extraterritorial measures. Ellermann finds
EU efforts to work effectively with foreign nation-states are still problematic after state-
level agreements are signed. This matters because extraterritorial migration research
usually focuses on negotiations that lead to the ‘outcome’ of an inter-state agreement,
but fails to examine how efforts to implement agreed policies play out in the social
world. This often leads to ‘outcomes’ that are different from objectives stated in policy
agreements. Ellermann (2008:180) shows how German ‘street- and mid-level interior
bureaucrats’ pursue informal strategies with their foreign counterparts: they work with
‘like-minded foreign law-and-order bureaucracies’ to circumvent conflicting state-level
interests over readmission agreements. In this way, German officials address non-com-
plaint behaviour with an agreement by establishing ‘strategic relationships’ and seeking
assistance from their foreign counterparts. This bypasses ‘the conventional diplomatic
route’ and allows immigration officers scope for agency by ‘effectively eliminat(ing)… a
level of decision-making marked by incongruent policy preferences’ (2008:181). These
findings matter because they show: first, incentives, diplomatic pressure and inter-state
policy agreements are not always sufficient to produce meaningful effective relationships
with foreign states and officials; and second, establishing meaningful practical working
relationships between mid-level officials, that are informal, based on ‘social capital’, can
provide more effective channels for implementing policy objectives than formal channels.
Many studies on extraterritorial migration management underestimate how difficult it
is even for a powerful nation-state to implement policy objectives on foreign territories,
where it has no formal authority, is dependent on foreign state agreement to establish a
presence, and has to try to implement this approach in the social world by cooperating
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with foreign authorities, while facing local conditions. Powerful states cannot simply
impose their will over weaker ones by force, like in colonial times. Also, there are few
attempts to study how ‘street-level’ negotiations between mid-level officials representing
states can lead to the implementation of extraterritorial controls, or not. We aim to coun-
terbalance these deficits.
First, it is important to acknowledge the power of foreign states acting on their own
sovereign territories to shape ‘outcomes’. Whatever a destination state’s intentions and
policy goals are, they have few chances of success unless a foreign state deemed an ‘immi-
gration risk’ has incentives to cooperate. At a general macro-level, motivations for inter-
state cooperations may come from political and historical ties (colonial ties), economic
interdependency (trade agreements, tourism, aid), or shared participation in inter-,
multi- or supra-national institutional frameworks and agreements (e.g. EU, NATO).
However, international relations are driven by factors that are largely external to
migration-specific issues. This means any pathway towards achieving desired cooperation
over migration is highly dependent on external and contingent factors. For example, the
UK sees Libya as ‘high risk’ but bi-lateral relations are so weak they provide no basis to
establish meaningful cooperation over migration on Libyan soil.
Second, even if foreign states formally agree to cooperate, implementing extraterritorial
measures leads to further steps that importantly shape ‘outcomes’. Immigration liaison
officials posted abroad lack formal legal authority to act on their policy goals. They are
dependent on their ability to establish meaningful working relationships with their
foreign counterparts in local immigration authorities and police. They draw on informal
relations and ‘soft powers’ of persuasion. In effect, they operate like ‘street-level bureau-
crats’ (Lipsky 1980) on-the-ground taking autonomous decisions in response to unex-
pected or uncontrollable circumstances.4 Even when there is a bi-lateral agreement, the
unwillingness of their counterparts, or general factors, such as corruption or poor infra-
structure, can hinder implementation. An important innovation of our contribution is
to include liaison officers acting as ‘street-level bureaucrats’ within the equation for a
state’s external immigration control efforts. The model presented next locates where
this agency fits in, alongside foreign states’ and officials’ agency, to influence the UK’s
extraterritiorial migration management policy process and ‘outcomes’. Perhaps deterred
by the secrecy around liaison officers, other studies have failed to include their agency
as a potential factor.
An analytic model for locating liaison officers’ and foreign officials’ agency
within the UK’s extraterritorial migration management
Figure 1 presents an analytic model that links the inter-state institutional level of policy
agreements to the on-the-ground level of agency and interactions by mid-level state
officials, who try to implement their respective state’s migration objectives. The aim of
the model is to show where ‘street-level’ agency occurs beyond ‘remote control’: it ident-
ifies the relationships between the UK and a foreign state, and the actor field that is sub-
sequently constructed by agency between liaison officers and foreign state officials, who
work together in relatively more or less cooperative relationships, to enforce the UK’s
migration policy objectives on-the-ground. In this way, it locates where key decisions
and actions take place, that are not the exclusive remit of a destination state government
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operating from within its own sovereign territory. Rather we see that actions in the social
world, outside a destination state’s jurisdiction and control, have substantial bearing on its
extraterritorial management. Importantly, the model introduces a level of decision-
making and agency that is largely overlooked -by UK and foreign state ‘street-level
Figure 1. An analytic model for locating liaison officers’ and foreign officials’ agency within the UK’s
extraterritorial migration management.
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bureaucrats’- and demonstrates the relations through which this can potentially influence
policies and ‘outcomes’ to a greater or lesser degree. It defines liaison officers’ agency as:
trying to define, initiate and implement UK policies on-the-ground; and providing ‘feed-
back’ that influences UK policy-making. In the empirical part, we examine the relation-
ships identified in the model to compare the UK’s extraterritorial migration efforts in
France, the USA, Thailand, Egypt and Ghana.
The logical starting point is the UK state, where the Home Office constructs and defines
perceived ‘immigration risks’ for specific countries, acting within a domestic politics
shaped by a government’s immigration objectives. After ‘immigration risks’ are
specified for a foreign state, a decision is taken over whether to support the strategy by
remote actions. Such decisions to negotiate inter-state agreements are shaped by inter-
national relations and depend on political, economic and historical ties between the UK
and a foreign state (a and b). International relations can be relatively equal, based on reci-
procity, in cases where there are strong institutionalised political interdependencies, they
are advanced economies, have strong historical ties, and share common immigration goals
towards less developed countries (USA, France). Relationships can also be asymmetrical
when the UK is higher in the ‘hierarchy of sovereignty’, and foreign states are lower-
middle-income developing countries, former colonies, retaining Commonwealth political
associations (Ghana), or rejecting them (Egypt), and whose migration-specific decisions
are made within a relative political and economic dependency. Sometimes the UK
decides to post officers in states it sees as transit hubs for ‘unwanted’ migration, but
with which it has relatively weak historical, economic and institutional ties (Thailand).
For the UK to achieve an inter-state agreement and place liaison officers on a foreign
state’s sovereign territory (c), a foreign state has to see sufficient self-interest from support-
ing the UK’s proposed migration control measures. While cooperative arrangements
between Global North states are relatively equal, reciprocal and based on mutually per-
ceived benefits, the UK may offer aid, preferential trade agreements, or political and mili-
tary support, to incentivise a Global South state to cooperate. Once an inter-state
agreement has been negotiated, a foreign state has to initiate implementation by issuing
directives to local state authorities that regulate population movements on its territory
(interior ministry, police, and immigration and border agencies) (d).
This creates a situation whereby two sets of officials, one from the UK, and one from the
foreign state, interact at the ‘street-level’, having received directives with regard to objec-
tives from their respective state ministries. Because UK immigration officers lack legal
authority to enforce immigration controls abroad, they must reach out and build
effective informal ties with their counterparts (e), who possess formal authority to
implement policy measures. Foreign state officers respond to these initiatives (f), by exert-
ing agency, and conducting actions that meet the UK’s policy goals, or do not. The degree
to which this is likely depends on the quality of the relationships established by liaison
officers with their counterparts, and the relative willingness of their counterparts to act.
External conditions can also hinder effective cooperations regardless of intentions, for
example, when foreign bureaucracies or police are poorly resourced or ‘corrupt’.
Foreign partners thus need to be both willing and able to implement measures rec-
ommended by liaison officers.
Importantly, this is a very long chain of command, that is not direct, and open to inter-
ventions and circumstances well beyond the Home Office and its liaison officers’ control.
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‘Outcomes’ on-the-ground can be strongly influenced by liaison officers’ personal abilities,
the willingness, abilities, and personalities of their counterparts, and interpersonal
relations. In addition, liaison officers also have an important role ’feeding back’ (g) evalu-
ations of perceived ‘immigration risk’, analyses and assessments of efficacy on-the-ground
to the Home Office. This can importantly shape the UK’s migration management policy
decisions, with respective to a specific country, and generally. For example, the decision to
end the presence of liaison officers in New York, in 2017, resulted from ‘feedback’ from
below, not a top-down initiative. This importantly shows that information and strategies
also move in the opposite direction to that implied by ‘remote control’ narratives. Finally,
just as liaison officers monitor the value and efficacy of relationships with their counter-
parts abroad, so police, local authorities and foreign state officials ‘feedback’ (h) to their
interior ministries, on whether cooperations meet intended goals. This can lead to
changes in approach by a foreign state’s higher-level bureaucrats and influence their will-
ingness to support further cooperations.
Method and data
This research is based on twenty semi-structured interviews with current and former
Home Office officials, between July 2016 and Oct 2017. The interviewees were primarily
mid- and lower-level civil servants who had experience working abroad and with
foreign state actors, including (but not limited to) immigration and law enforcement
officials fromGhana, Egypt, Thailand, the USA and France. The interviewees were selected
based on their familiarity with overseas operations, especially the liaison network. All
interviewees had experience in managing and/or implementing extraterritorial controls.
Despite efforts, we were unable to obtain interviews with foreign state actors. Our analysis
thus focuses on Home Office officials’ perceptions of the liaison network’s effectiveness and
foreign officials’ willingness to cooperate. Given secrecy surrounding Home Office activi-
ties, and commitments made to interviewees, we are restricted in information we can
Table 1. Interviews with current and former Home Office officials, July 2016–October 2017.
Interview Civil service rank Operational experience abroad
A mid-level yes
B mid-level yes
C mid-level yes
D mid-level yes
E senior no
F mid-level yes
G mid-level yes
H junior no
I mid-level yes
J mid-level yes
K junior yes
L mid-level yes
M mid-level yes
O mid-level yes
P mid-level yes
Q mid-level no
R mid-level yes
S mid-level yes
T senior no
U mid-level yes
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report to preserve anonymity. Table 1 provides limited information on the sample. We cite
the letter corresponding to an interviewee to indicate a source.
The interviews are supported by original FOI requests, documentary research on
primary and secondary legislation, explanatory memorandums, impact assessments, Inde-
pendent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration (ICIBI) reports, and UK policy
papers and press releases (Table 2). Information from interviews and FOI requests are
all original data sources previously unavailable in the public domain. They were hard to
retrieve. While UK Home Office documents cite general objectives of the liaison
network, there is virtually no public information on what liaison personnel actually do
in specific countries, who they work with and where they have police referral programmes.
Importantly, our original sources allowed us to go beyond existing literature which has
relied almost exclusively on policy documents and interviews with high-placed civil ser-
vants. By contrast, our approach draws largely on operational mid-level actors’ percep-
tions of their agency and effectiveness. Importantly, this allows us to take into account
the social world of local conditions and on-the-ground relationships with foreign state
officials as factors that have consequential effects.
Negotiating inter-state agreements
We start from the Home Office’s decisions to implement extraterritorial migration man-
agement. Such efforts are part of an overall strategy to limit and control immigration and
reduce perceived costs of legal obligations for deporting ‘unwanted’ migrants on British
soil: ‘[i]t is better to control entry before arrival, as far away as possible, given the extra
difficulties removal from the UK territory can present’ (HO 2005:25). Operating within
a domestic politics, where governments publicly prioritise immigration control, the
Home Office mobilises to identify, perceive and define ‘immigration risks’.
The liaison network of overseas immigration officers is an important, but relatively
hidden ‘tool’ in this effort to control migration. Liaison officers support the UK’s efforts
to implement control through visas by active interventions on-the-ground, including iden-
tifying inaccurate information and forgeries, and working with airlines and foreign auth-
orities to prevent ‘unauthorised’ movement. They also provide risk assessments
‘identifying threats to the UK border’ by collecting and analysing data on migration-
related trends and foreign states’ control capacities (A, F, T; Vine 2014:30). Liaison
officers’ knowledge production ’feedsback’ into the Home Office’s approach to defining
perceived ‘immigration risks’ and implementing control measures in specific foreign
states. For example, a Home Office report documents how new restrictive transit visa
requirements were introduced for Syrians, Libyans and Egyptians based on information
provided by liaison officers (HO 2011:3 and 4).
Prior to implementing control activities, the Home Office has to negotiate agreements
with foreign states to host UK officials on their soil. From the UK state’s perspective, the
aim is to place liaison officers in countries where perceived ‘immigration risks’ of
‘unauthorised’ migrants moving to the UK are sufficiently high to require interventions
that support an effective visa system. ‘(E)verything the (network does) is always dependent
on what the threat is to the UK…we focus on the areas where there is more risk and need’
(U). The Home Office is highly secretive about its assessments of ‘immigration risk’ and
the criteria and data sources used to legitimate their decisions (e.g. Ostrand FOI 46078).
10 N. OSTRAND AND P. STATHAM
Interviews and several documents, however, suggest ‘risks’ often relate to a perceived like-
lihood for ‘unwanted’ immigration, especially potential asylum seekers and visa over-
stayers who are framed as ‘abusing’ the UK’s rules and procedures, and to a much
smaller degree ‘crime’ and ‘security’ concerns, including ‘smuggling and trafficking in
persons’ (A, D, M; T; Home Office 2011; Vine 2011, 2014).
With regard to global spread, the Home Office aims to be systematic and implement a
coordinated network of liaison officers to meet policy goals: ‘All the key exit points toward
the UK, we have got offices there. We operate where there is a need to operate…We don’t
operate in countries where we have no migration threat and there is no visa operation’
(T). It is also clear that the UK’s ‘risk’ perceptions are dynamic and liaison officers’
‘feedback’ strongly informs and shapes adaptions: ‘(W)e move offices when we see the
threat change’ (T).
Once the Home Office identifies a perceived ‘need’ to place liaison officers in a country,
inter-state level negotiations are initiated with the foreign state. Important criteria that
shape possibilities for cooperation agreements are established political, economic, and his-
torical relations between the two states. The UK finds it relatively easy to implement
liaison officers on sovereign territories of foreign states like France and the USA, with
which it has strong historically established institutionalised channels for cooperation
over migration and security – e.g. EU (France); Five Country Conference5 (USA);
NATO (France and USA) – and shares common goals on most aspects of migration
control from the Global South. A Home Office official confirms this spill over of
common shared interests and historically established cooperations: ‘(W)e are all accus-
tomed to working with each other in all other formats: political, military, counter terror-
ism, law enforcement, not just immigration. Historic ties and longstanding MoUs
(memorandums of understanding) are also a decisive factor’ (C). However, it needs
stating that shared common interests over immigration, though great, remain relative
not absolute. EU member states sometimes attempt to ‘burden shift’ to one another,
with regard to accepting ‘unauthorised’ migrants and resultant legal responsibilities. In
such instances, EU states’ interests compete. The UK’s liaison presence in France is one
of its largest globally precisely because the Home Office perceives it as a key transit
country for ‘unauthorised’ immigration from the Schengen area (Cabinet Office
2007:40; F, H, L, Q, T).
By contrast there are states with which international relations are weak, or where the
country is unstable or dangerous, e.g. Eritrea, Iran, or Libya, so that the Home Office
sees few chances of posting liaison officers, although they are defined ‘high risk’. In
such cases, the UK seeks out potential agreements with nearby states. For example, an
officer recounts how more personnel were located in Egypt in 2015 because the Home
Office perceived irregular immigration via North African routes to be increasingly proble-
matic, ‘mainly in Libya but we could not go there so we had to work from Egypt’ (P).
Between highly established cooperations, and states where the UK has poor inter-
national relationships, there is a middle-ground of countries, mostly from the Global
South, which the UK state tries to incentivise to allow liaison officers on its territory. His-
torical and political ties still come into play. Of the twenty-five non-EU, non-NATO
countries where the Home Office had liaison officers in December 2015, ten had political
relationships as Commonwealth members (Ghana), while a further five had historical ties
as former colonies, but not Commonwealth members (Egypt). Other bases for the UK to
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build shared interests and reciprocity with states are from, first, perceived benefits through
economic trade relations, including possibilities for development aid, and second, by the
UK offering knowledge exchanges, training and equipment to improve a foreign state’s
security measures. Less wealthy countries are considered likely to want to cooperate
because they are ‘interested in access to the British trade market and in learning from
the UK’s expertise in immigration and border security’ (E).
The formal inter-state agreement the Home Office secures with a foreign state is essen-
tial in determining the potential degree and type of operations for liaison officers abroad.
Foreign governments and interior ministries have to authorise their presence on their
sovereign territory and international airports in their jurisdiction (F; Ostrand Internal
Review FOI 40413).6 The legal limitations of their own authority are very clear to
liaison officers: ‘Yeah, we have no legal powers overseas. So, you do what you do in
that location as the guest of whoever is the leadership of that country’ (T). This means
that a foreign government’s and interior ministry’s top-down steer to its local authorities,
police, and immigration services is of tantamount importance and shapes the depth and
type of possible cooperations with UK liaison officers. Several interviewees (L, I, T)
confirm the importance of foreign governments’ and senior officials’ support for getting
a meaningful foothold on foreign soil. One calls this support ‘political buy in’: ‘Getting
the political buy in is absolutely crucial… If the political will is there at least you can
make some inroads, maybe not as deep as you would like but you can make a start’ (I).
Another confirms: ‘(A)bsolutely, if the political will is there then the (police and immigra-
tion) authorities are more willing and interested’ (L).
A tangible feature of a foreign state’s relative ‘political buy in’ is whether the Home
Office is able to formally agree a Police Referral Programme (PRP), that allows UK per-
sonnel to share intelligence with local law enforcement agencies on individuals suspected
of participating in, or facilitating, ‘unauthorised’migration (Vine 2010). According to PRP
agreements, immigration officials and police are expected to use information supplied by
UK officers to investigate and prosecute implicated individuals. Importantly, from a
‘remote control’ perspective, these agreements are the Home Office’s attempt to enforce
punitive juridical actions against people they suspect are ‘unauthorised’ migrants’, or sup-
porting ‘unauthorised’ migration on foreign soil. A Home Office official highlights the
importance of PRPs: ‘What you have to understand is that if you found criminality,
you want to bring it to the local authority (otherwise) nothing happens, there are no con-
sequences and nothing to deter them from trying again’ (O).
With states like the USA that are close allies, PRP agreements are relatively easy to
establish within already strongly shared immigration cooperations. For EU countries,
like France, PRPs are not needed because there is already an institutionalised mechanism
that serves an equivalent purpose (M). In December 2015, the Home Office had PRP
agreements with 15 non-EU states, though refused to disclose which ones (Ostrand
FOI 42049; Ostrand Internal Review FOI 40413). Nonetheless, from interviews and by
reviewing reports, we know that for our cases PRPs existed in New York, USA (Vine
2011: 39), Accra, Ghana (HO and FCO 2010: 16; I), and Bangkok, Thailand (A, U), but
not Egypt (L).
Overall, foreign states are able to ‘push back’ and exert considerable agency over the
UK’s extraterritorial efforts. Their relative motivation to work with the UK is determinant
and derives from their specific pre-existing international relations, economic dealings, and
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perceived mutual benefits from cooperation. This important background context on the
depth and type of inter-state agreements foreign states are willing to accept, importantly
shapes the UK’s opportunities for effective liaison operations on-the-ground.
Liaison officers working with foreign officials: ‘street-level’ interactions
When inter-state agreements allow the operational presence of UK officers, we reach a
situation where, on one side, liaison officers attempt to implement immigration measures
on foreign soil, while on the other, local authorities, immigration services and police, act
on the directives of their interior ministries to support liaison officers’ initiatives. This step
from formal inter-state agreements to what actually happens on-the-ground is a long one
that is strongly shaped by decisions and interactions between mid-level officials from both
sides. Though understudied, it is important to make this link between the inter-state and
‘street-level’ exchanges. Here we study the UK’s extraterritorial efforts in the USA, France,
Thailand, Ghana, and Egypt to compare how the type, depth and quality of relationships
on-the-ground shape how it works, whether it is effective, and factors that account for
‘outcomes’.
A first important point is liaison officers possess a high degree of autonomy and discre-
tion in pursuing their own strategies for immigration management locally. The Home
Office does not have established extraterritorial interventions which it intends to
implement in a country. Much of what the UK’s liaison network does in a specific state
is decided in that country. To achieve their policy goals, liaison officials make judgments
about where they see greater ‘immigration risks’ and ‘need’ for action (D, E, M, O, T, U).
Liaison managers use this information to develop specific strategies to address perceived
areas of local ‘need’. ‘(Activities are) pretty much decided by the (liaison manager) in the
country because you know what your current threats are, what is the continuous problem
you keep seeing’ (U). Contrary to ‘remote control’ metaphors, here we see key decisions
about the UK’s extraterritorial interventions are open to interpretations and agency by
mid-level officials located abroad, rather than made by the Home Office from within its
own sovereign territory.
A second important point is a liaison network’s strategic aims must be reconciled with
the local context and constraints in a given country, especially the relative willingness of
foreign officials to cooperate. They consider ‘success’ depends on their ability to form good
relationships with local authorities, and develop joint initiatives, that fit their perceptions
of British ‘needs’ in the local context (E, F, I, L, O). A primary role is ‘liaising’ with foreign
officials, to create opportunities to work with local immigration and law enforcement
agencies (A). Importantly, liaison officers’ activities are the product of negotiations and
compromises with their local counterparts: ‘We work and build relationships in a
country, but they also work with us… In fact, I think it is a two-way street’ (T). In
countries where liaison officers have good relationships with local officials, they meet reg-
ularly to discuss what their counterparts want to improve, and aspects of migration control
and law enforcement that fit UK objectives (E, I, O, T). Interviewees emphasise that inter-
personal skills and cultural awareness are crucial attributes (F, I). A job advertisement
underlines this stating it ‘requires someone with excellent interpersonal skills in order
to build effective working relationships with… (liaison network) regional teams, UK
teams, and external partners’ (HM Government 2016).
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Liaison officers think a key to their ‘success’ is establishing trust and familiarity in
working relationships with local authorities and police, so that they can try to be
effective in the absence of formal legal power. A Home Office official highlights that a
‘high degree of trust’ is necessary ‘to get to the real issues without worrying about
offending and tarnishing the relationships’ (E). This shows the importance for liaison
officers of building ‘social capital’ on location, that bridges to their foreign counterparts,
as a resource to be effective. In some cases, local officials seek out liaison officers and
request training, resources and capacity building support (E, I, O, T). An officer recounts,
‘(w)e are open to that’ (T), while another confirms ‘(w)e will train anyone who needs it, to
be honest’ (O). For example, liaison officers provided ‘tailor-made trainings’ in ‘human
trafficking’, document authenticity and investigative skills at the request of Ghanaian
officials to meet domestic goals (I). This demonstrates local officials are able to exert
agency by bargaining with liaison officers, in ways that shapes ‘outcomes’ on-the-ground.
Overall, we found liaison officers employ ‘street-level’ diplomacy, ‘soft power’ and
incentives with their counterparts on-the-ground to try and reach their objectives. Nego-
tiations tend to be relatively low-level, localised, and personal: ‘You wouldn’t normally tell
someone they are inefficient in certain ways when you are coming through and you are
developing projects with the local law enforcement partners… So, you know, you
might get a shopping list of equipment and we say ‘actually we are not in position to
fund that. But what we can do is provide the following which will give you the capability
to do that without the equipment’’ (T).
‘Outcomes’ on-the-ground are strongly shaped by the relative receptiveness of local
authorities and police to their overtures. In the USA and France, Home Office officials
explain very high levels of cooperation on their mutual trust with officials, good
working relationships, and shared view that cooperation was mutually beneficial to
policy goals. Historical legacies of cooperation, frequent meetings and institutional mech-
anisms associated with the EU and the Five Country Conference also facilitated greater
collaboration (A, C, E, M, T). The EU, for example, has an arrangement allowing
officers to exchange information with police from any EU country (M). However, on-
the-ground cooperation is very high, not absolute. Notwithstanding high levels of infor-
mation-sharing between UK officers and local French immigration and law enforcement,
including joint investigations and enforcement (Brokenshire 2015; M), France is still
defined an ‘immigration risk’ for ’unauthorised’ transit migration travelling through the
Schengen area. There are a large number of French regional airports with regular cheap
flights to UK destinations and the Home Office perceives that officials working at these
airports lack the resources, skills and motivation to conduct effective document checks
(D, M, Q). One official even claimed personnel at regional airports in France sometimes
‘turn a blind eye’ to ‘unauthorised’ migrants leaving the country because they prefer them
to move to Britain (M).
Generally, in developing countries the UK’s efforts depend much more on officers’ abil-
ities to establish semi-formal relations with their counterparts. The potential effectiveness
of liaison officers is importantly shaped by the foreign local authorities’ perceived benefits
of cooperation. Interviewees recount how officers in ‘some countries have a fantastic
relationship because law enforcement does absolutely everything for them, and they
want that kind of close engagement’ (U), while in others, ‘they are just not interested’
(O). Although liaison officers strive to form good working relationships and elicit
14 N. OSTRAND AND P. STATHAM
effective cooperation from local authorities in developing countries, their foreign counter-
parts’ perceived interests are beyond their control, and subject to external and contingent
factors.
Egypt’s postcolonial relationship with the UK has often been strained, it remains outside
the Commonwealth. A Home Office official recounts how the Egyptian government
rejected the UK’s attempts to initiate a PRP with the claim ‘we don’t want to cooperate.
There is nothing in it for us’ (I). Subsequently, liaison officers’ efforts to establish training
and enforcement initiatives failed ‘due to the lack of political will’, which meant local ‘auth-
orities just did not cooperate’ (L). Clearly, in cases where inter-state relations are weak,
working on-the-ground is much harder. So, Egypt has no PRP and receives no training
by liaison officers. Despite officers’ strong efforts, ‘(i)t was difficult to do that with Egyp-
tians: they did not want to engage’ (P). As a result, fraudulent documents are not confis-
cated, incidents not investigated, and perpetrators not held accountable (O). This
highlights how important support from local foreign authorities is for liaison officers to
be effective. As one underlines: ‘(I)f you are not actually working with the people, the
local authorities, and you get a situation where (an airline refuses boarding), then
nothing else happens… no one is taking the forged documents or looking at the crime
groups behind what’s going on… there are no consequences and nothing to deter them
from trying again’ (O). When relations with local authorities are poor, liaison officers try
to find other strategies. In Egypt, officers ‘had to get creative and look for other ways of
working with various people, like having a better relationship with the airlines’ (I).
In stark contrast, official documents and interviewees document how the UK sees its
relationship with Ghana as a ‘model’ for good working relationships on migration and
border control – there is a PRP and especially good relations with the police and immigra-
tion agency (I; Cabinet Office 2007, 54; FCO 2010; HO and FCO 2010: 16; Vine 2012: 18).
Ghana is a Commonwealth member, with a less fractious postcolonial relationship than
Egypt. Generally, officers consider that Ghanaian state authorities see benefits in maintain-
ing good relations with the UK, including more development aid, trade, and technical
training, so cooperate on migration control (E, I, L). This high receptiveness of Ghanaian
police and immigration officials allows liaison personnel a space to advance enforcement-
related initiatives and ‘provides considerable scope to develop prevention and capacity
building in Ghana’ (I). In fact, Ghana is the only state where ‘developing local capacity’
is a primary objective. Officers train Ghanaian officials in interviewing skills, profiling
techniques, identifying inaccurate documents, investigative skills, intelligence use, and
IT, and donate equipment to support investigations. In addition, officers helped their Gha-
naian counterparts set up specialised units in human trafficking and immigration crime (I,
S). A Home Office official explains Ghanian authorities’ motivations for cooperating on
what he perceives as their interests in gaining increasing UK support: ‘if they cooperate
then they are likely to get more assistance from us on building their (immigration and
law enforcement) capability, and aid and assistance on other fronts. Also, it improves
the business environment, improves the credibility… and probably development aid
and trade’ (L).
Yet, even when high local cooperation is achieved, there are still contextual and
environmental factors that can limit overall effectiveness. In Ghana, officials think the
PRP is ‘working very well’, and ‘the police are regularly involved’, but also acknowledge
that ‘the end result might not always be what we would desire’ (I, L). Specifically, the
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number of arrests is lower than the UK wants, and few result in prosecutions. One inter-
viewee blames long delays and regular dismissals by courts, which he attributes to over-
extended detention facilities and justice systems. He also claims corruption by low-level
officials in the government, police and courts impedes ‘successful’ outcomes (I).
Thailand is a significant location for the UK’s extraterritorial efforts. This is not due to a
Thailand-specific ‘immigration risk’, but because Bangkok hosts a large visa centre that
also processes applications from neighbouring Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar
and Vietnam (Ostrand FOI 44306; U), and a large international airport with a high
volume of inbound flights from African and Asian countries that are considered ‘risks’
and many outbound flights to the UK (A, F). Thailand and the UK have a PRP agreement
that demonstrates intent to cooperate. However, officers still trace what they see as limited
effectiveness in implementing migration control measures and relatively poor relations
with Thai police and immigration authorities back to relatively weak inter-state relations
and divergent goals: ‘it is just not high on the Thai government’s priority list’ (A). The Thai
state is not involved in close multi-national institutional cooperative arrangements with
the UK, nor is it a former colony, so there are few historical and political ties to build
on. ‘(I)n Thailand we are not such a big player. We do not have so much influence…
as we would in other countries (like) Ghana which is obviously a former Commonwealth
country’ (U).
As a result, on-the-ground relations between UK liaison officials and their Thai counter-
parts are relatively poor, so that PRP objectives fail at the implementation stage. This
example clearly illustrates that formal bi-lateral agreements tell us relatively little about
what actually occurs in practice. As one official recounts: ‘(I)t is very difficult to get anything
done here in Thailand… if we come across forgeries in the visa process, if we refer that
information to the Thai police, um well nothing ever happens’ (U). The UK officials’
lack of trust in, and weak social capital with, the police means they resist sharing intelli-
gence (A): ‘(T)he… thing in Thailand is about trust. It is a continuous change of comman-
ders… and… sometimes we will have information we give to them and we ask them that
the information is not for disclosure to the public or during an investigation and they still
tell people. So that is why we are wary of what kind of cooperation we give’ (U).
Liaison officers’ effectiveness is also limited because Thai priorities on migration man-
agement do not coincide with the UK’s goals. An interviewee, for example, claims the Thai
immigration agency ‘doesn’t really care who is leaving their country’, so officers concen-
trate their training efforts ‘on who is entering the country on (forged) UK documents’,
which is a shared interest: ‘(T)hat is all we can do… (immigration authorities) only
care about who is coming in’ (U). Once again, we see foreign state actors exerting
agency on the UK’s extraterritorial migration management efforts, compelling liaison
officers to negotiate and make compromises that reflect others’ interests and priorities.
Finally, liaison officials encountered environmental factors that made it hard to collabor-
ate, especially IT systems incompatible with the UK’s that made it hard to share infor-
mation on false documentation.
Conclusion
This study provides a necessary counterbalance to understandings of how extraterritorial
migration management ‘works’. It challenges core assumptions of the highly influential
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‘remote control’ framing. We consider claims in ‘remote control’ perspectives that ‘out-
comes’ of migration management policies implemented abroad are largely a semi-auto-
matic result of the government’s and Home Office’s agency in the UK, exaggerated and
even false. Against this, we find there is a very long chain of decisions and actions, by
foreign and UK state actors, operating at different levels, not least the ‘street-level’ on
foreign soil, as well as uncontrollable circumstances, that shape possibilities for UK
officers to be ‘effective’ in implementing policy goals abroad. While ‘remote control’
invokes a simple one-way causality, policy implementation turns out to be ‘messy’ in
the social world. It is open to numerous factors beyond the Home Office’s control, so
that policy ‘outcomes’ are sometimes remote from a state’s intentions. ‘Remote control’
perspectives start with the view that powerful Global North destination states are
primary agents and ‘in control’, but seldom interrogate this assumption. This is proble-
matic because governments from powerful states construct myths over their ability to
‘control’ immigration specifically for public consumption within their domestic politics.
Researchers adopting this idea of ‘control’, uncritically, perpetuate this ideology. Instead
our findings show that the idea that the Home Office exercises ‘control’ by extraterritorial
measures is factually very much an overstatement.
First, our findings demonstrate liaison officers exercise autonomy over decisions and
actions on foreign soil. They are primary agents implementing policies and have authority
to respond to on-the-ground experiences and conditions as they arise. They lead in estab-
lishing ‘street-level’ working relationships with counterparts, which are essential to
implement effective measures geared towards preferred ‘outcomes’. Although structured
by specific conditions of inter-state relations, we also find policy ‘outcomes’ on-the-
ground are open to happenchance and serendipity, in that they result from an officer’s
ability to build quality relationships and ‘social capital’ with counterparts. Another
point is that liaison officers decisively shape UK extraterritorial policies by ‘feeding
back’ opinions and assessments that significantly influence the Home Office’s perceptions
of ’immigration risk’. Here influence runs in the opposite direction to that implied by
‘remote control’. Liaison officers’ agency is largely unstudied, perhaps because the
Home Office cloaks their activities in secrecy. However, decision-making by mid-level
officials operating abroad matters a great deal for Home Office extraterritorial policies,
both overall and for specific countries.
Second, foreign states are not just ‘takers’ of UK extraterritorial policies. Inter-state
agreements and international relations between the UK and a foreign state shape a
specific opportunity structure for cooperation over migration management. Our compara-
tive study shows these vary considerably across foreign states, depending on historical,
political and economic relations and common goals over controlling migration flows to
the Global North. Once an inter-state agreement is made that allows UK officers to
operate on a state’s sovereign territory, the top-down steer foreign states give their auth-
orities to support liaison officers’ goals, or not, importantly defines the scope for on-the
ground cooperations and resultant ‘outcomes’. Much depends on a foreign state’s mid-
level officials’ willingness to work with their UK counterparts at the ‘street-level’, which
is contingent on local factors, especially the quality of relationships. However, even
when local authorities offer support, as in Ghana, there can be contextual factors – e.g.
weak judicial processes – that limit effectiveness at the implementation stage. Foreign
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states’ and officials’ agency and the local context are largely missing from ‘remote control’
perspectives.
A final point is that today extraterritorial migration management is a ‘normal’ central
component of a state’s immigration control measures. Earlier research on bi-lateral cases
studies depicted ‘remote control’ as ad hoc or exceptional to immigration control at a
state’s border. However, in an interrelated world of nation-states, available migration
pathways are defined by a global system of migration management imperatives, which
means that powerful states work together to routinely implement controls in transit
and sending states (FitzGerald 2020). For research, it is increasingly important to under-
stand a state’s extraterritorial efforts relative to its place within a global ‘hierarchy of sover-
eignty’ of states controlling population movements. This requires expanding the
conceptual lens by studying agency beyond the classic ‘remote control’ bi-lateral case
study. Our study examines the UK’s extraterritorial efforts across five states precisely to
unpack variations that result from the UK state’s place in a world system of migration
management. We also show that liaison officers are substantively ‘street-level’ agents oper-
ating beyond ‘remote control’, by demonstrating how their agency on location – especially
their interactions with foreign officials, and ‘feedbacks’ to the Home Office – influences the
decisions, implementation and ‘outcomes’ of the UK’s extraterritorial migration policies.
Notes
1. This article focuses on IEI activities (formerly RALON – Risk and Liaison Overseas
Network). IEI is distinct from overseas Border Force officers –present in 11 countries in
2015 (Ostrand Internal Review FOI 43366) – whose wider remit includes ‘border security’
and ‘smuggling and trafficking in humans and contraband’ (J).
2. Exceptions include Bosworth (2020) on UK–France ‘juxtaposed border controls’ and deten-
tion and Arbel (2013) on US–Canada ‘safe third country’ agreements.
3. The recent study by Adam et al. (2020) on migration policy-making in Ghana and Senegal is
an important original contribution and exception in this respect. Their findings demonstrate
that migration policy approaches in West African countries targeted by (EU) international
cooperations are shaped by a dynamic interplay of international and domestic interests,
and therefore need to be studied as ‘intermestic’ policy issues.
4. Ethnographic studies exist on immigration officials’ decision-making as ‘street-level bureau-
crats’ in receiving countries (Eule 2018), but there is virtually nothing on immigration
officials posted abroad (though see Infantino 2019 on visa officers).
5. The Five Country Conference is an informal group of immigration authorities from Global
North states, the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the UK, that meets regularly and
collaborates.
6. See also Section 4.2, 2002 International Airport Transportation Association code of conduct
for liaison officers (IATA/CAWG 2002), which the UK legally follows (Madder FOI 28330).
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Table 2. Cited official sources, documents, and freedom of information requests.
Author and date Title Type of source
Brokenshire, James,
2015
Letter from James Brokenshire MP, Minister
for Security and Immigration, to the Chair
of the Committee, 2 March 2015
Written evidence by Minister for Security and
Immigration to Home Affairs Select Committee
Cabinet Office, 2007 Security in a Global Hub: Establishing the UK’s
New Border Arrangement
Policy document, UK Cabinet Office
FCO, 2008 Better World, Better Britain: Department
Report, 1 April 2007–31 March 2008
Annual report, Foreign and Commonwealth
Office
FCO, 2010 British High Commission in Accra Supports
Ghana’s Fight against Illegal Migration
Press release: https://www.gov.uk/government/
news/british-high-commission-accra-supports-
ghanas-fight-against-illegal-migration
HM Government,
2016
Immigration Liaison Officer Job vacancy, immigration liaison officer, New
Delhi, India: https://fco.tal.net/vx/mobile-0/
appcentre-ext/brand-2/candidate/so/pm/4/pl/
1/opp/368-Immigration-Liaison-Officer/en-G
HO and FCO, 2010 International Challenges, International
Solutions: Managing the Movement of
People and Goods
Policy document, Home Office and Foreign and
Commonwealth Office
HO, 2005 Controlling Our Borders: Making Migration
Work for Britain Five Year Strategy for
Asylum and Immigration
Policy document, Home Office and HM
Government
HO, 2011 ‘Changes to the UK’s Transit Visa Regime for
Syria, Libya and Egypt’
Home Office Impact Assessment, no. HO0059:
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukia/2011/351/
pdfs/ukia_20110351_en.pdf
IATA/CAWG, 2002 A Code of Conduct for Immigration Liaison
Officers
Code of Conduct, International
Air Transport Association Control
Authorities Working Group
Madder FOI 28330,
2013
‘RALON’ Freedom of information request: https://www.
whatdotheyknow.com/request/
ralon#incoming-429887
Ostrand FOI 40413,
2016
‘RALON Locations and Number of Staff’ Freedom of information request: https://www.
whatdotheyknow.com/request/ralon_
locations_and_number_of_st
Ostrand Internal
Review FOI 40413,
2016
‘Internal Review – RALON Locations and
Number of Staff’
Freedom of information request internal review:
https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/
ralon_locations_and_number_of_st#incoming-
904299
Ostrand FOI 42049,
2016
‘RALON’s Referral Programme’ Freedom of information request: https://www.
whatdotheyknow.com/request/ralons_referral_
programme
Ostrand Internal
Review FOI 43366,
2017
‘Internal Review – Border Force Posted
Abroad’
Freedom of information request: https://www.
whatdotheyknow.com/request/border_force_
posted_abroad#incoming-1016216
Ostrand FOI 44306,
2017
‘Hub and Spoke Visa Locations for January
2017’
Freedom of information request: https://www.
whatdotheyknow.com/request/hub_and_
spoke_visa_locations_for
Ostrand FOI 46078,
2018
‘Profiling for Immigration Purposes’ Freedom of information request: https://www.
whatdotheyknow.com/request/profiling_for_
immigration_purpos#incoming-1110025
Ostrand FOI 46475,
2018
‘IEI Locations as of December 2017’ Freedom of information request: https://www.
whatdotheyknow.com/request/iei_locations_
as_of_dec_2017
UNTWO, 2019 ‘International Tourism Highlights’ World Tourism Organisation website, accessed
December 2019: doi/10.18111/9789284421152
Vine, John, 2010 An Inspection of the Risk and Liaison Overseas
Network (RALON) in Islamabad and the
United Arab Emirates: January to April 2010
Report, Independent Chief Inspector of the UK
Border Agency
Vine, John, 2011 An Inspection of the UK Border Agency Visa
Section in New York
Report, Independent Chief Inspector of the UK
Border Agency
Vine, John, 2012 A Short-notice Inspection of Decision-making
Quality in the Accra Visa Section
Report, Independent Chief Inspector of the UK
Border Agency
Vine, John, 2014 A Short-notice Inspection of Decision-making
Quality in the Paris Visa Section, 10–13 June
2014
Report, Independent Chief Inspector of Borders
and Immigration
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